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Abstract 
Rule-governed behavior and derived relational responding have both been identified as 
important variables in human learning. Recent developments in relational frame theory (RFT) 
have outlined a number of key variables of potential importance when analyzing the dynamics 
involved in derived relational responding. Recent research has explored the impact of one of 
these variables, level of derivation, on persistent rule-following and implicated another, 
coherence, as possibly important. However, no research to date has examined the impact of 
coherence on persistent rule-following directly. Across two experiments, coherence was 
manipulated through the systematic use of performance feedback, and its impact was examined 
on persistent rule-following. A training procedure based on the implicit relational assessment 
procedure (IRAP) was used to establish novel combinatorially entailed relations that 
manipulated the feedback provided on the trained relations (A-B and B-C) in Experiment 1, 
and on the untrained, derived relations (A-C) in Experiment 2. One of these relations was then 
inserted into the rule for responding on a subsequent contingency-switching match-to-sample 
(MTS) task to assess rule persistence. While no significant differences were found in 
Experiment 1, the provision or non-provision of feedback had a significant differential impact 
on rule-persistence in Experiment 2. Specifically, participants in the Feedback group resurged 
back to the original rule for significantly more responses after demonstrating contingency-
sensitive responding than did the No Feedback group, after the contingency reversal. The results 
highlight the subtle complexities that appear to be involved in persistent rule-following in the 
face of reversed reinforcement contingencies. 
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The importance of the impact of rules or instructions on human behavior has long been 
acknowledged within the behavior-analytic literature (e.g., Michael, 1980). The concept of 
rule-governed behavior was first proposed by Skinner (1966) within the context of an operant 
account of problem-solving. At this time, rules were defined as contingency-specifying 
stimuli that allowed a listener to problem-solve without having to contact the relevant 
reinforcement contingencies directly. For example, the simple rule “Don’t eat the berries 
growing on a Holly tree, they’re poisonous” allows the listener to learn to avoid eating toxic 
berries without directly experiencing sickness.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, a wealth of research emerged that focused on the impact 
of rules on human performance on schedules of reinforcement (for an early book-length 
review, see Hayes, 1989). One of the key findings that emerged from this work was that for 
humans with basic language skills, behavior under the control of rules or instructions quite 
often led to what was described as insensitivity to direct contingencies of reinforcement (e.g., 
Bentall, Lowe, & Beasty, 1985; Catania, Shimoff, & Matthew, 1989). For example, following 
an un-cued change in reinforcement contingencies, participants who had initially been 
responding in accordance with an experimenter-given rule were more likely to persist in 
following that rule for longer than participants who had not been given such a rule, despite it 
now resulting in limited access to reinforcers (e.g., Hayes, Brownstein, Haas, & Greenway, 
1986; Le Francois, Chase, & Joyce, 1988; Shimoff, Catania, & Matthews, 1981). This rule-
based insensitivity has since been widely argued to play an important role in human 
psychological suffering  (e.g., Baruch, Kanter, Busch, Richardson, & Barnes-Holmes, 2007; 
Rosenfarb, Newland, Brannon, & Howey, 1992; Zettle & Hayes, 1982). Specifically, it has 
been argued that human psychological suffering can be understood in terms of excessive rule-
following, which by definition undermines or reduces contact with reinforcers in the natural 
environment. The literature investigating the role of rule-governed behavior in human 
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psychological suffering, however, is scarce and conflicting in nature. For example, some 
research suggests that excessive rule-governance may be associated with self-reported 
depression (McAuliffe et al., 2014), while others have reported that individuals with self-
reported depression are in fact more sensitive to changes in environmental contingencies, or 
their behavior is less rule-governed (Baruch et al., 2007; Rosenfarb et al., 1993). Conflicting 
results such as these highlight the need for further research on excessive rule-following if we 
are to better understand how it may play a potentially important role in human psychological 
distress. 
While rule-based insensitivity to direct contingencies of reinforcement seemed to be a 
key feature of human behavior, a second feature that came to light around the same time was 
that of derived relational responding. This concept emerged in the early 1970s with the 
seminal work of Sidman and colleagues (e.g., Sidman, 1971; Sidman & Tailby, 1982), and the 
early work in this area focused almost exclusively on a phenomenon that came to be known as 
stimulus equivalence (see Sidman, 1994 for a book-length review). The key finding was that 
untrained or unreinforced responses often quite readily emerged out of a small number of 
trained or reinforced responses. For example, if reinforcement was provided for matching two 
abstract stimuli, one of which was also matched to a third (e.g., A=B and B=C), previously 
unreinforced responses often emerged (e.g., A=C and C=A). When such a pattern of 
unreinforced responding occurred, the stimuli involved were said to form an equivalence class 
or equivalence relation. Crucially, this phenomenon appeared to occur with relative ease in 
verbally-able humans, but was not readily or reliably observed with nonhumans or with 
humans with severely limited language abilities. Indeed, the lack of clear evidence for even 
the most basic types of equivalence responding in nonhumans has persisted (see Dougher, 
Twohig, & Madden, 2014).  
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The extension of stimulus equivalence as a core explanatory tool for analyzing the 
complexities of human behavior came with the development of relational frame theory (RFT: 
Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001; Steele & Hayes, 1991). RFT is a behavior-analytic 
account of human language and cognition that views stimulus equivalence as but one class of 
generalized operant behavior, and posits that many others are possible. Specifically, RFT 
proposes that there are many generalized relational operants and the generic term or concept, 
arbitrarily applicable relational responding (AARR) is used to label these operant classes. 
According to RFT, extended histories involving many relevant reinforced exemplars serve to 
create different patterns of relational responding, referred to as relational frames, such as: 
similarity, difference, opposition, distinction, hierarchy, temporal, and deictic (see Hughes & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2016, for an extensive review). 
While the experimental analyses of derived stimulus relations and of rule-governed 
behavior have only rarely overlapped (e.g., Harte, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
McEnteggart, 2017; O’Hora, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2004), conceptually the link 
between the two has been relatively strong. That is, both Sidman (1994) and Hayes et al. 
(2001) argued that the human capacity to engage in derived relational responding may be 
important for understanding the ways in which contingencies of reinforcement come to be 
specified by rules (see also Hayes & Hayes, 1989). Indeed, some research thereafter has 
suggested that derived relational responding could provide the basis for a technical analysis of 
rule-governed behavior, and this has been successfully modelled in the laboratory (O’Hora et 
al., 2004; O’Hora, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2014). 
More recently, research has begun to extend this work by examining the impact of 
different features of derived relational responding on rule-based insensitivity or rule 
persistence (e.g., Harte et al., 2017; Harte, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & McEnteggart, 
2018; Monestes, Greville, & Hooper, 2017). For example, the study by Harte et al. (2017) 
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sought to investigate the extent to which participants persisted in rule-following on a 
contingency-switching match-to-sample (MTS) task. In one condition, participants were 
provided with a direct instruction that required no derived relational responding within the 
experiment; in a second condition, following the instruction required that participants derived 
the meaning of the instruction within the experiment. Specifically, the direct rule involved 
instructing participants to choose the comparison image that was the least like the sample 
image. In the derived rule condition, however, participants were first trained and tested for a 
derived relation between the phrase “least like” and a novel word “beda.” The novel word was 
then inserted into the instruction for responding on the MTS task (i.e., “Choose the image that 
is beda the sample image”). The researchers also manipulated the number of opportunities 
participants had to obtain points for following this rule before the un-cued contingency 
reversal (Experiment 1, 10 opportunities; Experiment 2, 100 opportunities). In each 
experiment, the contingency reversal was followed by 50 trials. While no differences in 
persistent rule-following emerged in Experiment 1 between the direct and derived rule 
conditions, when the opportunities to follow the reinforced rule were more protracted in 
Experiment 2, the direct rule produced greater persistence than the derived rule condition (and 
a control condition that involved presenting no relevant rule).  
In discussing their findings, Harte et al. (2017) noted that they had not manipulated 
relative levels of derivation within the experiments. Specifically, it was assumed that in the 
direct rule condition derivation would be extremely low relative to the derived rule condition, 
because a direct rule did not involve deriving a new relation during the experiment. In a 
subsequent study (Harte, et al., 2018), therefore, the authors manipulated levels of derivation 
within the experiment and replicated the basic effect reported previously – lower levels of 
derivation appeared to generate greater rule-persistence. This was the case for both mutually 
entailed (Experiment 1) and combinatorially entailed relations (Experiment 2).  
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Conceptually, the research reported by Harte et al. (2017, 2018) focused on levels of 
derivation on persistent rule-following, in part because it was closely linked to the 
development of a new framework for conducting RFT-based research more generally (see 
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Luciano, & McEnteggart, 2017). This framework is known 
as the multi-dimensional, multi-level (MDML) framework and conceptualizes AARR as 
varying along five levels of relational development and four dimensions. The five levels are 
seen as increasingly advanced forms of relational development progressing from: (1) mutual 
entailment; (2) combinatorial entailment; (3) relational networks; and (4) relating relations; to 
(5) relating relational networks. The framework presents these five levels as intersecting with 
four contextual dimensions: (1) coherence; (2) complexity; (3) derivation; and (4) flexibility. 
The MDML framework was designed to have extremely broad scope as a tool for guiding 
RFT-based research, and thus a detailed treatment of it is beyond the remit of the current 
article (but see Barnes-Holmes, Finn, McEnteggart, & Barnes-Holmes, 2018 for a recent 
summary). Nevertheless, the framework was used to offer post-hoc interpretations of the 
differential results found by Harte et al. (2017), and in identifying level of relational 
development (i.e., mutual versus combinatorial entailment) as a potentially important variable 
for experimental analysis in Harte et al. (2018). Thus, it seems important to draw on the 
framework to justify the rationale for the current research, to which we now turn. 
The research by Harte et al. (2017, 2018) involved integrating the work on derived 
relations and rule-persistence, and focused specifically on the dimension of derivation, across 
two levels of relational development (mutual and combinatorial entailment), as specified 
within the MDML framework. Another potentially important variable of interest highlighted 
within the framework is the dimension of coherence. Within the framework, coherence refers 
to the extent to which a particular pattern of relational responding is consistent (coherent) 
with a previously established pattern. For example, if you are told that ‘A is larger than B,’ 
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the derived response that ‘B is smaller than A’ would be deemed coherent, but the response 
‘B is the same size as A’ would not (unless, of course, the wider context was modified to 
support an ‘incoherent’ response, such as ‘Please respond to all questions with a silly 
answer’).  
The primary purpose of the current study was to use a similar paradigm as Harte et al. 
(2018) to train novel relations, but to manipulate coherence instead of derivation, through the 
systematic use of feedback1. That is, would a condition involving higher levels of 
coherence/more corrective feedback in the newly trained relations produce more or less 
persistence in rule-following on the same contingency-switching MTS task than a condition 
involving no feedback on these relations? Experiment 1 involved training participants on 
novel A-B and B-C relations followed by further retraining of these relations with and without 
feedback. Experiment 2 involved training participants on the same novel A-B and B-C 
relations followed by directly testing the novel A-C relations with and without feedback. A 
range of self-report measures of psychological distress was used to explore the extent to 
which derived rule-following may correlate with self-reported levels of distress in the general 
population. Two self-report measures of rule-following were also employed to determine if 
they would predict actual persistent rule-following. Given the exploratory and relatively 
inductive nature of the current research, we refrained from making formal predictions. 
Experiment 1 
As previously noted, Experiment 1 involved manipulating coherence, through the 
provision of differential performance feedback. Specifically, we asked if delivering such 
feedback for newly trained relations would produce more or less persistence in rule-following 
                                                          
1 Coherence may be defined as both an operation and as a process. In the current study, the provision versus non-
provision of feedback should be seen as an attempt to define coherence as an operation. Coherence as a 
behavioural process, however, is an inference that is made based on the observation of specific behavioral effects 
or changes that arise from the operation. This is entirely consistent with the definition of reinforcement as an 
operation (a contingency) and as a process (a change in behavior as a result of that contingency; Catania, 1979). 
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on a contingency-switching MTS task than a condition involving no feedback. Experiment 1, 
therefore, involved training participants on novel A-B and B-C relations followed by further 
retraining of these relations with and without feedback. 
Participants  
A total of 98 individuals participated in Experiment 1, 74 females and 24 males. They 
ranged in age from 18 to 26 years (M = 20, SD = 2.16) and were recruited through random 
convenience sampling from the online participant system at Ghent University. All participants 
spoke Dutch as their first language and were paid a fixed sum of 10 euros. Participants were 
assigned to one of two conditions, referred to as Feedback and No Feedback; the sequence in 
which participants signed up for the study determined the condition to which they were 
assigned (i.e., in general, odd numbered = Feedback; even numbered = No Feedback). The 
data from 38 participants (20 from No Feedback and 18 from Feedback) were excluded 
because they failed to meet specific performance criteria on either a Training IRAP or an 
MTS task (see below), leaving N = 60 for analysis, 30 in the Feedback condition and 30 in the 
No Feedback condition.  
Setting 
 The experiment was conducted in a cubicle at Ghent University in which participants 
were seated in front of a standard Dell laptop. The experimenter was present in the cubicle at 
the beginning of each stage of the experiment to instruct participants about that stage, but left 
each participant alone thereafter. The experimenter re-entered the cubicle at various points 
throughout the experiment; for example, when transitioning from one stage to the next (see 
below).  
Materials and Apparatus 
Experiment 1 involved three computer-based tasks (a Derivation Pre-Training task, the 
Training IRAP, and an MTS task) and five self-report measures. The Derivation Pre-Training 
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task and the Training IRAP employed a total of eight stimulus sets, each comprised of three 
separate stimuli (see below). Participants completed all aspects of the experiment on a 
standard Dell laptop. 
The Derivation Pre-training Task. The purpose of the Derivation Pre-training Task 
was to provide participants with a history within the experiment of relating stimuli that were 
deemed to be semantically similar or dissimilar. The task involved six sets of stimuli, with 
three stimuli in each set (see Table 1). During the task, the stimuli were presented in pairs in 
such a way that for some pairs participants should already know the relation between them 
because they were English and Dutch words (e.g., “hond” and “dog”). For other pairs, the 
relation between them should be unknown because the pairs contained an Irish word (e.g., 
“madra” and “dubh”) or a nonsense stimulus (e.g., “XXX” or “////”). The remaining pairs 
contained words that allowed participants to derive a relation between a known Dutch word 
and a previously unknown Irish word. The general purpose of this pre-training task was to 
prepare participants for deriving the target relations with completely novel stimuli in the 
context of persistent rule-following in subsequent stages of the experiment (pilot work had 
indicated high levels of attrition without this type of pre-training). 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
The Derivation Pre-training Task was presented in Microsoft PowerPoint. All trials 
presented a label stimulus at the top of the screen (e.g., “Hond”, the Dutch word for “Dog”), a 
target stimulus in the middle (the English word “Dog”), and two response options, for 
example, the Dutch words “Goed” (meaning correct) and “Verkeerd” (meaning incorrect), 
which appeared at the bottom left and right of the screen.  
The Training IRAPs. Consistent with Harte et al. (2018), three Training IRAPs were 
used to establish a relational network involving directly trained relations between known 
words (A stimuli) and symbols (B stimuli), and between the same symbols and novel words 
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(C stimuli). The IRAPs employed stimuli from Sets 7 and 8 (see Table 2). As such, during 
training of the A-B relations,  Dutch words and phrases were presented (the English 
translations are used here). All trials presented a label at the top of the screen, with a single 
target below and two response options. The label stimuli always comprised one of two 
phrases “Least Similar” or “Most Similar”, the target stimulus was always “TTT” or “]][[”, 
and each pair of response options comprised “True” versus “False”, “Yes” versus “No”, 
“Correct” versus “Incorrect”, or “Right” versus “Wrong”. These stimuli were combined to 
generate four A-B trial types referred to as: Least Similar-TTT; Most Similar-TTT; Least 
Similar-]][[; and Most Similar-]][[ (see Figure 1).  
INSERT TABLE 2 & FIGURE 1 HERE 
During training of the B-C relations, each trial presented the stimuli “TTT” or “]][[” as 
labels, the novel words “Beda” and “Sarua” as targets, along with the same response options. 
Taken together, the four B-C trial types were as follows: TTT-Beda; ]][[-Beda; TTT-Sarua; 
and ]][[-Sarua (see Figure 2).  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
The mixed A-B/B-C Training IRAP was similar to the A-B and B-C Training IRAPs, 
except that A-B and B-C relations were presented within each block of training trials, rather 
than across two separate IRAPs. This created eight trial types, identical to the four A-B trial 
types and the four B-C trial types listed above.  
The MTS task. During each MTS trial, a sample stimulus (always a random shape) 
was presented at the top of the screen, with three comparison stimuli (all random shapes, but 
none identical to the sample nor to each other) along the bottom (see Figure 3 for an example 
of a single trial). Each comparison varied in its similarity to the sample. Specifically, one 
comparison was clearly the most similar to the sample (same basic shape with minor 
variations, see center of Figure 3). A second comparison was also quite like the sample, but 
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with more variations (see left-hand side of Figure 3), rendering it less similar to the sample. 
Finally, the third comparison was clearly the least similar to the sample because it had little or 
no overlapping features (right-hand side of Figure 3). Each sample and three-comparison 
combination comprised an individual stimulus set, such that only those comparisons appeared 
in the presence of that sample. Participants emitted a response by pressing the key (D, G, or 
K) directly below the comparison they wished to select. A total of 54 stimulus sets were 
employed, with each set presented at least once, but no more than three times, across 150 
trials.  
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
Questionnaires. Experiment 1 involved five self-report questionnaires, three of which 
were standardized measures (the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales, DASS-21; the 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, AAQ-II; the Generalized Pliance Questionnaire, 
GPQ), the fourth of which, the Psychological Flexibility Index (PFI), is currently still under 
development, and the fifth of which, the Propensity to Rule-Following Scale (PRFS), was 
created by Harte et al. (2018) to measure rule-persistence. The first three scales were included 
as measures of psychological distress because such measures have been related to persistence 
in rule-following in previous research (e.g., McAuliffe, Hughes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2014). 
The final two scales were included as self-report measures of persistent rule-following. 
The DASS-21 comprises three subscales measuring depression, anxiety, and stress 
across a total of 21 statements, with 7 statements per subscale (e.g., an item from the anxiety 
subscale was “I found it hard to wind down”; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). All items were 
rated in terms of participant experiences within the last week on a 4-point scale from 0 (Did 
not apply to me at all) to 3 (Applied to me very much or most of the time). An overall DASS 
score is calculated by summing all 21 items. However, all overall and subscale scores 
obtained must be doubled, and severity bands are generated accordingly. Specifically, the 
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overall DASS score ranges from 0-126. Higher scores on the overall scale and on each 
subscale indicate greater psychological distress. The measure has demonstrated excellent 
internal consistency (Henry & Crawford, 2005): depression (alpha = 0.88); anxiety (alpha = 
0.82); stress (alpha = 0.90); and total DASS (alpha = 0.93). The Dutch version of the scale, 
which according to deBeurs, Van Dyck, Marquenie, Lange, and Blonk (2001) has yielded 
similar sufficient internal consistency, was employed in the current experiment.  
The AAQ-II measures acceptance of negative private events across 7 statements (e.g., 
“My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilled life”; Bond et al., 2011). All items 
were rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (Never true) to 7 (Always true), yielding a minimum 
score of 7 and a maximum of 49. High scores indicate low acceptance, while low scores 
indicate high acceptance. The measure has demonstrated adequate internal consistency with 
alpha coefficients ranging from 0.78 to 0.88 (Bond et al.). Again, the Dutch version of the 
scale was employed in the present experiment. According to Bernaerts, De Groot, and Kleen 
(2012), this version has yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85. 
The PFI is a measure currently under development and designed to measure 
psychological flexibility (Bond et al., 2017), across a total of 80 statements (e.g., “Even when 
I am uncertain of what to do, I can still do what is right for me”). All items were rated on a 
Likert scale from 1 (Disagree strongly) to 6 (Agree strongly) and the measure yields a total 
score (based on the summation of all items), with a minimum of 80 and a maximum of 480. 
High scores indicate high flexibility, while low scores indicate low flexibility. All items were 
translated into Dutch using the backward-forward method. As the measure is still in 
development, there are currently no published validity or reliability data.  
The GPQ is designed to measure generalized pliance (Ruiz, Suárez-Falcón, Barbero-
Rubio, & Flórez, in press). Pliance was originally defined as rule-governed behavior that is 
controlled mainly by consequences mediated by the speaker for correspondence between the 
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rule and behavior (e.g., when a young child follows the rule “Eat your vegetables and you can 
have ice-cream”; Zettle & Hayes, 1982). All 18 items on the GPQ (e.g., “My decisions are very 
much influenced by other people’s opinions”) were rated on a Likert scale from 1 (Never true) 
to 7 (Always true) and the measure yields a total score (based on the summation of all items), 
with a minimum of 18 and a maximum of 126. High scores indicate high pliance, while low 
scores indicate low pliance. Due to the fact there is no Dutch translation available, all items 
were again translated into Dutch using the backward-forward method. This translation has no 
reliability data. However, the English version has demonstrated adequate internal consistency 
in undergraduate, general, and clinical populations with alpha coefficients of .93, .95 and .97, 
respectively (Ruiz et al.).  
The PRFS was created by Harte et al. (2018) to assess propensity to rule-following 
across 6 statements (i.e., “I would describe myself as someone who follows rules”; “If 
someone gives me a rule to follow, I do my best to follow that rule”; “I break rules often”; 
“When I break rules I feel uncomfortable”; “Rules are made to be broken”; and “If I was 
given a rule to follow and the rule proved to be incorrect, I would abandon the rule”). All 
items were rated on a Likert scale from 1 (Always agree) to 5 (Always disagree), yielding a 
minimum score of 6 and a maximum of 30. Items 3, 5, and 6 were reverse scored. High scores 
indicate low propensity for rule-following, while low scores indicate high propensity for rule-
following. No evidence on the psychometric properties of the PRFS is available. 
Procedure 
 Experiment 1 comprised five stages (see Figure 4). Stage 1 presented the three initial 
questionnaires (i.e., DASS-21, AAQ-II, and PFI). Stage 2 presented the Derivation Pre-
training Task which comprised three cycles, each made up of three phases: Phases 1 and 2 
always comprised four trials, while Phase 3 always comprised six trials. In Phases 1 and 2, the 
relation between the two stimuli was always one of similarity, whereas in Phase 3, the relation 
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was always one of difference. Stage 3 involved the Training IRAPs, which comprised four 
phases: Phase 1 presented the A-B relations Training IRAP; Phase 2 presented the B-C 
relations Training IRAP; Phase 3 presented the A-B/B-C relations Training IRAP, in which 
A-B and B-C relations were mixed randomly within each block of trials. Phase 4 was similar 
to Phase 3, except that half of the participants continued to receive feedback on each trial of 
the A-B/B-C Training IRAP, whereas the other half did not. Stage 4 involved the MTS task, 
with rule-consistent contingencies in Phase 1 and rule-inconsistent contingencies in Phase 2. 
Finally, Stage 5 presented the remaining questionnaires (i.e., GQP and PRFS). 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
Stage 1: DASS-21, AAQ-II, and PFI. Participants completed the DASS-21, the 
AAQ-II, and the PFI in that order, and proceeded immediately to Stage 2. 
Stage 2: The Derivation Pre-training Task. The aim of the Derivation Pre-training 
Task was to minimize the attrition observed in previous studies using this paradigm (e.g., 
Harte et al., 2018, 2017), by providing participants with the opportunity to derive relations of 
sameness and difference between two stimuli based on a single “mediating” third stimulus. A 
total of 42 trials were presented, and on each trial, the experimenter read aloud the two on-
screen stimuli (e.g., “Hond” with “Dog” or “Hond” with “Black”) and asked participants to 
respond to the question “Do these two stimuli have the same meaning?” by stating, for 
example, “Yes” or “No”, which appeared on the bottom left- and right-hand sides of the 
screen.  
The experimenter recorded each response and provided corrective feedback on every 
response. The next trial was presented immediately after. The Derivation Pre-training Task 
comprised three separate cycles of training (see Table 3). Each cycle contained the same three 
phases and the same training trials; only the stimulus sets differed across the three cycles (see 
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Table 1). Participants progressed immediately from one phase to the next and from one cycle 
to the next. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Phase 1: Co-ordination relations I. Phase 1 consisted of four trials involving stimulus 
Set 1. The first trial presented the stimuli “Hond” and “Dog” (feedback was provided after all 
trials); the second trial presented “Dog” and “Madra”; the third trial presented “Hond” and 
“Madra”; and the fourth trial presented the stimuli from the third trial but in the reversed 
order, “Madra” and “Hond.” Correct responding involved relating all of these stimuli as the 
same. 
Phase 2: Co-ordination relations II. Phase 2 also consisted of the same four trials, but 
involving the stimuli from Set 2. Again, the first trial presented “Hemd” and “Shirt”; the 
second presented “Shirt” and “Leine”; the third presented “Hemd” and “Leine’; and the fourth 
presented the stimuli from the third trial but in the reversed order, “Leine” and “Hemd.” 
Correct responding involved relating all of these stimuli as the same. 
Phase 3: Distinction relations. Phase 3 consisted of six trials that combined the 
relations established above. The first trial presented “Hond” and “Black”; the second 
presented “Zwart” and “Dog”; the third presented “Dog” and “Dubh”; the fourth presented 
“Black” and “Madra”; the fifth presented “Hond” and “Dubh”; and the sixth presented 
“Zwart” and “Madra”. Correct responding involved relating all of these stimuli as different. 
 Cycles 2 and 3 were identical to Cycle 1, except that new stimulus sets were employed. 
Specifically, Cycle 2 employed Set 3 (“Hemd”, “Shirt”, “Leine”) and Set 4 (Fles, Bottle, 
Buideal) and Cycle 3 employed Set 5 (Boek, XXX, Leabhar) and Set 6 (“Jas”, “////”, “Cota”). 
As noted above, Sets 5 and 6 contained both words and symbols. At the end of the third cycle, 
participants proceeded immediately to Stage 3. 
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Stage 3: The Training IRAPs. Participants were initially instructed orally on how to 
complete the Training IRAP. That is, they were advised that each trial would present a phrase 
at the top of the screen with a symbol in the center, and that their task was to relate these 
together using one of the two response options as accurately as possible across each block 
(i.e., pressing D for the left option or K for the right option). This stage involved three 
Training IRAPs presented across four phases, and participants were required to reach the 
mastery criteria on each phase before proceeding to the next. 
Phase 1: A-B Relations Training IRAP. Phase 1 consisted of a block of 24 trials 
involving “Least Similar” and “TTT” from Set 7, and “Most Similar” and “]][[” from Set 8. 
There were four trial-types: Least Similar-TTT; Least Similar-]][[; Most Similar-]][[; and 
Most Similar-TTT. Correct responding was as follows: Least Similar-TTT/True; Most 
Similar-TTT/False; Least Similar-]][[/False; and Most Similar-]][[/True. There were six 
exposures to each trial-type, presented quasi-randomly within each block of 24 trials. Given 
that this was a Training IRAP, if a correct response was emitted the word “Right!” appeared 
immediately in the centre of the screen, and the next trial appeared 400ms later. If an incorrect 
response was emitted, a red X appeared until a correct response was emitted. Participants 
received automated feedback on their overall accuracy and latency performances at the end of 
the first block of trials. If they had failed to achieve a mean accuracy (≥ 80%) and/or a mean 
latency (≤3000 ms) per trial-type during Phase 1, they were re-exposed to Phase 1 until these 
criteria were reached, at which point they could proceed to Phase 2. 
Phase 2: B-C Relations Training IRAP. Phase 2 consisted of a block of 24 trials 
involving “TTT” and “Beda”, and “]][[” and “Sarua”. The four trial-types were: TTT-Beda; 
TTT-Sarua; ]][[-Sarua; and ]][[-Beda . Correct responding was as follows: TTT-Beda/True; 
]][[-Beda/False; TTT-Sarua/False; and ]][[-Sarua/True. Again, there were six exposures to 
each trial-type and all other aspects of Phase 2 were identical to Phase 1.  
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Phase 3: Mixed A-B and B-C Relations Training IRAP. Phase 3 consisted of a block 
of 32 trials involving all of the stimuli from Sets 7 and 8, presented in the same manner in which 
they had been presented in Phases 1 and 2, all within the same block. Each of the four trial-
types from Phase 1 and each of the four from Phase 2 were presented four times each, quasi-
randomly. All other aspects of Phase 3 were identical to Phases 1 and 2. Participants could not 
proceed to Stage 4 until they had reached the mastery criteria on all three phases of Stage 3. It 
is important to emphasize that all participants received feedback on each trial throughout Phases 
1-3 of the Training IRAP. 
Phase 4: Mixed A-B and B-C Relations with or without Feedback. Phase 4 was 
similar in format to Phase 3, with the only exception that half of the participants (Feedback 
condition) received feedback on every trial and at the end of each block (as they had done 
previously), while the other half (No Feedback condition) no longer received feedback at any 
point, across two identical blocks of trials. Instead, at the beginning of the Training IRAP, 
participants in the No Feedback condition were explicitly instructed that they would no longer 
receive feedback at any point, but that it was still possible to get all trials correct. No 
performance criteria applied in Phase 4; thus all participants proceeded through each of the 
two blocks and then immediately to Stage 4 once Phase 4 was complete.  
Stage 4: MTS task. At the beginning of the MTS task, participants were instructed to 
“Respond by selecting the shape that is Beda to the sample stimulus.” It is important to recall 
that “Least Similar” had been trained as coordinate with “TTT”, and “TTT” was trained as 
coordinate with “Beda”; hence, based on that training it was now assumed that participants 
could correctly derive that “Least Similar” was coordinate with “Beda.” They were then 
instructed that each trial would present a shape at the top of the screen with three shapes on 
the bottom. Participants were advised that they would be awarded one point for each correct 
response and deducted one point for each incorrect response, and that their total score would 
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appear after each trial. All participants were explicitly instructed to try to accrue as many 
points as possible. The total MTS task comprised 150 trials, 100 trials presented in Phase 1 
and 50 trials presented in Phase 2.     
Phase 1: Rule-consistent contingencies. During the 100 trials that comprised Phase 1, 
all participants were required to select the comparison that was least similar to the sample. 
When a correct response was emitted, one point was awarded, and the screen cleared 
immediately to present the total number of points accrued thus far (in large red text in the 
center of the screen) for 3s. Emitting an incorrect response resulted in the loss of one point, 
again followed by a display of the total number of points. These feedback contingencies were 
thus consistent with the instruction to select the comparison that was least similar to the 
sample. 
Phase 2: Rule-inconsistent contingencies. At precisely the 101st trial, the task 
contingencies were reversed without warning. That is, the contingencies for correct and 
incorrect responding switched for the 50 trials that comprised Phase 2. Therefore, correct 
responding now involved selecting the comparison that was physically most similar to the 
sample, rather than least similar.  
Stage 5: GPQ and PRFS. After the MTS task, participants completed the GPQ and 
the PRFS in that order. 
Results and Discussion 
For the purposes of analysis, exclusion criteria were applied to both blocks of Phase 4 
of the Training IRAPs. In each condition, the data from one participant was removed because 
they failed to maintain ≥75% accuracy and ≤3500ms response latency criteria per trial-type in 
both training blocks (N = 96 remaining). As an aside, the mastery criteria for training trials 
was set at 80% and 3000ms, but the exclusion criteria for the test trials were set at 75% and 
3500ms. The slightly relaxed criteria for testing was designed to reduce potential attrition, 
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particularly in the No Feedback condition, and this was consistent with the exclusion criteria 
employed in Harte et al. (2018). A strict accuracy criterion was also applied to the MTS task 
and required correct responding on at least 8 of the first 10, as well as 80 of the first 100 trials 
in Phase 1. This MTS task criterion was consistent with Harte et al. (2017, 2018), and again 
was designed to reduce the likelihood that participants learned to respond correctly and match 
the stimuli on the basis of trial and error. The data from 36 participants were removed when 
these participants failed to achieve this criterion, 17 from the Feedback condition and 19 from 
the No Feedback condition (N = 60 remaining). Although this strict criterion (at least 8 out of 
the first 10 trials correct) led to the removal of many datasets, it was deemed essential that 
participants in both conditions performed equally well from the very beginning of the MTS 
task, because a potential difference at this point might indicate that one group learned to 
respond more through trial and error on the initial MTS trials than through derivation that was 
based on the previous IRAP training.      
IRAP Data 
Before conducting the primary analyses, we compared the mean number of blocks in 
Phases 1-3 of the Training IRAPs required by participants in each condition. On the A-B 
relations, Feedback participants required a mean of 1.73 blocks (SD = 1.34), while No 
Feedback participants required 1.61 (SD = 0.88). On the B-C relations, Feedback participants 
required 1.33 blocks (SD = .55), while No Feedback participants required 1.23 (SD = .50). 
Finally, on the mixed A-B and B-C relations, Feedback participants required 1.30 blocks (SD 
= .92), while No Feedback participants required 1. Overall therefore, the mean number of 
training blocks required by the Feedback group was 4.37 (SD = 2.17), while the No Feedback 
group required 3.84 (SD = .93). Independent t-tests confirmed that none of these differences 
were significant (all p’s > .07, without correction for multiple tests). Thus, any subsequent 
differences that emerged between the two groups during the experimental feedback 
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manipulation in Phase 4 of the Training IRAP or the MTS task are not likely due to 
differences in the ability to learn how to respond on the IRAP per se. 
Measures of Rule Persistence 
Insofar as the primary aim of Experiment 1 was to compare performances between the 
Feedback and No Feedback conditions, the data from the 50 trials in Phase 2 of the MTS task 
presented after the contingency reversal were analyzed in three ways (based on Harte et al., 
2018). The three types of analyses which examined rule persistence are referred to as: rule 
compliance; contingency sensitivity; and rule resurgence. 
Rule compliance was defined as the total number of responses (out of 50) that were 
consistent with the initial instruction “Respond by selecting the shape that is Beda [Least 
Similar] the sample stimulus”, but were inconsistent with the reversed contingencies on the 
last 50 trials. Figure 5 (left-hand side) presents the group means for rule compliance and 
shows little difference between the conditions. That is, the Feedback group emitted almost the 
same number of responses (M = 19.97, SD = 17.004) in accordance with the original 
instruction as the No Feedback group (M = 18.267, SD = 14.90). An independent t-test 
confirmed that this difference was not significant, t(58) = .41, p = .68. 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
Contingency sensitivity was defined as a pattern that comprised of at least 3 
consecutive responses that were not in accordance with the original instruction, and at least 1 
of these must accord with the reversed contingency. In principle, therefore, a participant could 
stop following the instruction and choose instead the stimulus that lost points (i.e., the 
stimulus that was ‘mid-way’ between most like and least like the sample), but could only do 
this for 2 of the 3 responses. Including this requirement ensured that the term ‘contingency 
sensitivity’ was appropriate, given that a participant must obtain at least 1 point when they 
ceased rule-following. However, a post-hoc analysis of the data at the individual participant 
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level indicated that all participants selected the most similar comparison across all 3 responses 
(gaining 3 points), hence showing contingency sensitivity.  
Mean contingency sensitivity scores are presented in Figure 5 (right panel) and show a 
small difference between the conditions. Specifically, the Feedback group completed more 
trials (M = 18.33, SD = 16.63) before responding in accordance with the new contingencies 
than the No Feedback group (M = 14.40, SD = 11.29). However, an independent t-test 
indicated that this difference was not significant, t(58) = 1.06, p = .29. 
Rule resurgence attempted to capture responding that was consistent with the initial 
rule (i.e., percentage of responses), but which occurred after a participant had emitted 3 
consecutive responses that were in accordance with the reversed contingencies (hence the 
term ‘resurgence’). This measure was designed to supplement contingency sensitivity, which 
fails to capture when responding reverted in this way to the original rule-consistent pattern of 
responding. In order to illustrate individual resurgence most clearly, Figure 6 (left-hand side) 
presents the density and range of participant data in each condition. The data indicate modest 
levels of resurgence in both conditions, with some suggestion that resurgence may have been 
greater in the No Feedback group. Given that the data were severely skewed, a Mann Whitney 
U-test was employed, and the difference proved not to be significant (No Feedback condition: 
Md = 7.44, Feedback condition: Md = 5.53, U = 404, z  = -.680, p = .50, r = .08).  
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE 
When analyzing the individual resurgence data, we noted that participants who did not 
abandon the original rule (and thus did not at any point emit 3 consecutive responses in a 
contingency-sensitive direction) could not by definition demonstrate resurgence. The right-
hand panel of Figure 6 thus contains the data from only those participants who could in 
principle show resurgence (N=25 Feedback and N=28 No Feedback). When the data were re-
analyzed with a Mann Whitney U-test, the analysis confirmed once again that the difference 
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was not significant (No Feedback: Md = 8.95, Feedback: Md = 7.75, U = 349, z = -.018, p = 
.99, r = .002). 
Correlations 
Given that the conditions did not differ significantly on any measure of rule-
persistence, correlational analyses were conducted with the data collapsed across groups. Out 
of a possible 24 correlations among the three measures of rule-persistence and the eight self-
report measures, only one reached significance. That is, contingency sensitivity positively 
correlated with the PRFS (r =.217, p = .04), such that participants who reported higher levels 
of rule-following were, perhaps counterintuitively, less likely to persist with rule-following on 
the MTS task. Given that only one relatively weak correlation was significant, this result 
should be interpreted with extreme caution. 
Summary 
The current work, as far as we are aware, was the first to investigate the potential 
impact of coherence on persistent-rule-following involving derived relations, by manipulating 
the presence versus absence of feedback during repeated exposures to the baseline training. 
The findings from Experiment 1 suggested that the presence or absence of feedback did not 
differentially influence rule compliance, contingency sensitivity, or rule resurgence. In effect, 
increasing relational coherence with the use of feedback (for the baseline relations) appeared 
to have virtually no impact on persistent derived rule-following. On balance, Harte et al. 
(2017, 2018) argued (in their Discussion sections) that a combination of high coherence and 
low derivation might facilitate more persistence in rule-following, but they did not manipulate 
coherence directly. In principle, in Experiment 1 of the current study level of derivation for 
the untrained A-C relations could be defined as relatively high because participants were not 
required to derive these relations until they entered the MTS rule-following task. In 
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Experiment 2, participants were required to derive the A-C relations before entering the MTS 
task, thus reducing levels of derivation relative to Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we again manipulated coherence through the presence versus 
absence of differential feedback, but the manipulation was now applied to a Training IRAP 
that required participants to derive the A-C relations. In effect, we sought to reduce levels of 
derivation relative to Experiment 1, while manipulating coherence for the derived relations 
through the presence versus absence of feedback.  
Participants 
A total of 115 individuals participated in Experiment 2, 95 females and 20 males. 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 42 years (M = 20.39, SD = 3.09), and were recruited 
through random convenience sampling from the online participant system at Ghent 
University. All participants spoke Dutch as their first language. Twenty participants (10 in 
each condition, see below) received course credit for participation, while the remaining were 
paid 10 euro for participation. All participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions, again referred to as Feedback and No Feedback. The data from 25 participants (12 
from Feedback and 13 from No Feedback) were excluded, because they failed to meet either 
the IRAP performance criteria or the MTS task criteria (leaving N = 90 for analysis, 45 in 
Feedback and 45 in No Feedback). Initially, we collected data from 30 participants in each 
condition, after which a strong trend toward significance emerged on the rule resurgence 
measure (details provided below). At this point, we made an a priori decision to collect data 
from an additional 15 participants in each condition, in order to determine if the trend 
continued to a significant level. It is important to note, however, that we did not continue to 
add participants to each condition until we reached significance. Rather, given the strong 
trend observed with 30 participants, and the lack of previous work to draw upon in order to 
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conduct a power analysis, a set number of 15 additional participants in each condition was 
decided upon, and analyses were only conducted once this final dataset was complete.  
Setting 
 The setting was identical to that in Experiment 1. 
Materials and Apparatus 
Experiment 2 again involved three computer-based tasks (a Derivation Pre-training 
task, the Training IRAP, and an MTS task; the Derivation Pre-training task and MTS task 
were identical to Experiment 1), as well as five self-report measures. The only difference in 
materials between Experiments 1 and 2 was in the configuration of the stimuli presented in 
the final phase of the Training IRAP.  
The Training IRAPs. The Training IRAPs again employed stimuli from Sets 7 and 8, 
but now the A-C relations, that could be derived from the mixed A-B and B-C Training 
IRAPs, were presented. Specifically, each trial presented the stimulus “Least Similar” or 
“Most Similar” as labels, with the novel words “Beda” and “Sarua” as targets, along with the 
same response options as before. Taken together, the four A-C trial types were as follows: 
Least Similar-Beda; Most Similar-Beda; Least Similar-Sarua; and Most Similar-Sarua (see 
Figure 7).  
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE 
Procedure 
The only procedural difference between Experiments 1 and 2 concerned the addition 
of trials presenting A-C relations in the Training IRAP.  
Stage 3: Training IRAPs. Phases 1, 2, and 3 of the Training IRAPs in Experiment 2 
were identical to those in Experiment 1. Phase 4 in Experiment 2 differed from Experiment 1, 
however, in that it no longer presented two blocks of the mixed A-B and B-C relations from 
Phase 3, but now replaced these with two blocks of previously untrained A-C relations. As in 
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Experiment 1, coherence was again manipulated via feedback such that participants in the 
Feedback condition received feedback on every A-C trial and at the end of each block, while 
participants in the No Feedback received no feedback on these trials, or at the end of each 
block. All participants were advised that during this stage some of the stimuli that they had 
seen previously would be presented again, but in combinations that they had not seen before. 
Participants were also explicitly instructed not to worry about speed of responding (because 
the target relations were novel) but to focus on accuracy (i.e., “Because this block will involve 
presenting the stimuli you have learned about before in combinations that you haven’t seen 
them in before, don’t worry about speed. Instead, take your time, and focus on getting them 
all right”).  
Results and Discussion 
The same accuracy criterion (≥75%), as applied in Experiment 1 to the Training IRAP, 
resulted in data from 8 participants being removed (5 in Feedback and 3 in No Feedback, N = 
107 remaining). Unlike Experiment 1, the response latency criterion was not applied in 
Experiment 2, again because the target relations were novel (i.e., not preceded with direct 
training). The same MTS accuracy criterion applied again, resulting in the data from 17 
participants being removed (8 in Feedback and 9 in No Feedback, N = 90 remaining).  
IRAP Data 
Again, prior to conducting the primary analyses, we compared the mean number of 
blocks required in each condition in Stages 1-3 of the Training IRAP. On the A-B relations, 
Feedback participants required a mean of 2.20 blocks (SD = 1.46), while No Feedback 
participants required 2.04 (SD = 1.17). On the B-C relations, Feedback participants required 
1.69 blocks (SD = .82), while No Feedback participants required 1.40 (SD = .65). Finally, on 
the mixed A-B and B-C relations, Feedback participants required 1.47 blocks (SD = 1.04), 
while No Feedback participants required 1.27 blocks (SD = .50). Overall, therefore, the mean 
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number of blocks required was 5.36 (SD = 2.13) for the Feedback group and 4.71 (SD = 1.62) 
for the No Feedback group. Independent t-tests confirmed that none of these differences were 
significant (all p’s > .07, without correction). Thus, any subsequent differences that emerged 
between the two groups during the Training IRAP or the MTS task would not likely be due to 
differences in the ability to learn how to respond on the IRAP per se. 
Measures of Rule Persistence 
Rule compliance scores are presented in Figure 8 (left panel) and showed only a small 
difference between the conditions (Feedback: M = 18.40, SD = 14.99, No Feedback: M = 
15.56, SD = 14.43). An independent t-test confirmed that this effect was non-significant t(88) 
= .917, p = .36. 
INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE 
Contingency sensitivity scores are presented in Figure 8 (right panel) and again show 
only a small difference between conditions (Feedback, M = 14.64, SD = 11.48; No Feedback, 
M = 16.09, SD = 13.98). An independent t-test again confirmed that this difference was not 
significant, t(88) = -5.36, p = .59. 
Figure 9 (left-hand side) presents differential levels of rule resurgence among all 
participants in each condition (i.e., there were no exclusions made on the basis of absence of 
contingency sensitivity). The data show modest resurgence and a greater range in participant 
resurgence scores in the Feedback condition but not in the No Feedback condition. For 
example, a cluster of participants resurged for over 90% of responses in the Feedback 
condition, while no participants resurged to this degree in the No Feedback condition. Given 
that the data were once again severely skewed, a Mann Whitney U-test was employed, which 
confirmed that the difference was significant (Feedback, Md = 5.41, No Feedback, Md = 4.65, 
U = 723.5, z  = -2.332, p = .02, r = .25).  
INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE 
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Once again, in order to more closely examine only those participants who had the 
opportunity to resurge (i.e., those participants who demonstrated contingency-sensitive 
responding for three consecutive responses after the contingency reversal), we included only 
those datasets in right-hand panel of Figure 9 (N=42 Feedback and N=39 No Feedback). 
Once again, there was modest resurgence in the Feedback group but not in the No Feedback 
group. When the data were re-analyzed with a Mann Whitney U-test, the difference remained 
significant (Feedback, Md = 6.43, No Feedback, Md = 5.00, U = 594.50, z = -2.122, p = .03, r 
= .24).  
Correlations 
Given that the conditions did not differ significantly on the rule compliance and 
contingency sensitivity measures, correlational analyses were conducted with the data 
collapsed across groups among these two measures of rule persistence and the self-report 
scales. Out of a possible 16 correlations, only one reached significance; contingency 
sensitivity positively correlated with the PRFS (r = .213, p = .04), such that participants who 
reported a low propensity for rule-following were more likely to persist on the MTS task. 
Given the significant group differences recorded on the rule resurgence measure, separate 
correlational analyses were conducted for each condition between resurgence and the self-
report scales. Two separate sets of analyses were conducted, the first involving all participants 
(in each condition), the second excluding participants (from each condition) who did not 
demonstrate contingency-sensitive responding. In the first analysis, one correlation was 
significant, in the No Feedback condition. Specifically, rule resurgence positively correlated 
with the GPQ (r = .40, p = .006), such that greater rule resurgence predicted higher 
compliance. In the second analysis, the same correlation remained significant (r = .37, p = 
.02). No other correlations were significant (all other ps > .08). 
Summary 
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The findings from Experiment 2 suggested that manipulating the presence or absence 
of feedback on the novel derived A-C target relation differentially influenced participant rule 
persistence, but only on one specific measure. While there seemed to be no impact of the 
feedback manipulation on the rule compliance or contingency sensitivity measures, significant 
differential responding did emerge on the rule resurgence measure. Specifically, participants 
in the Feedback condition resurged for a significantly greater percentage of rule-consistent 
responses than did participants in the No Feedback condition. In effect, increasing relational 
coherence with the use of feedback (on the untrained, derived A-C relation) appeared to 
impact persistent derived rule-following in terms of participant rule resurgence. Additionally, 
rule resurgence was correlated positively with scores on the GPQ, but only in the No 
Feedback condition. That is, when participants who scored high in self-reported compliance 
did not receive feedback on the derived A-C relation in the Training IRAP, they were more 
likely to resurge on the MTS task. 
General Discussion 
The current study sought to extend the work reported by Harte et al. (2017, 2018), 
which had targeted the impact of derivation on persistent rule-following. Specifically, Harte et 
al. (2017) had shown greater levels of persistence for direct rules (which were assumed to be 
low in derivation) versus high-derivation rules (i.e., rules that contained a derived relation 
established within the experiment). In Harte et al. (2018), levels of derivation were 
manipulated directly within the experiment, and once again low levels of derivation produced 
greater persistence in rule-following. This effect for derivation was shown for both mutually 
(Experiment 1) and combinatorially (Experiment 2) entailed relations. In the context of the 
experimental work reported by these authors, it was noted that coherence may also play an 
important role in persistent rule-following. For example, Experiment 1 of Harte et al. (2017) 
did not find a difference in persistent rule-following between direct and derived rules when 
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coherence between the rule and the reinforcement contingencies was low (i.e., participants 
were only given 10 opportunities to follow the rule before the contingencies switched). In 
contrast, Experiment 2 showed clear differences between direct and derived rules when 
participants were given 100 opportunities to follow the rule before the contingency switch.  
In the research described above, coherence was used in a post-hoc manner to interpret 
unexpected results and thus it seemed important to examine the impact of coherence directly 
within the context of studying persistent rule-following. In the current research, we attempted 
to manipulate coherence through the provision or non-provision of feedback for the trained 
relations (Experiment 1) or the derived relations (Experiment 2), that were then inserted into 
the rule for responding on the MTS task. The main question we asked was would a condition 
involving higher levels of coherence/more corrective feedback, for trained and/or derived 
relations, produce more or less persistence in rule-following?  
In Experiment 1, the results indicated that coherence/feedback had no impact on rule 
persistence across any of the three measures (rule compliance, contingency sensitivity, or rule 
resurgence). In Experiment 2, however, feedback significantly impacted upon rule resurgence. 
That is, participants in the Feedback group resurged back to the original rule for significantly 
more responses after demonstrating contingency-sensitive responding than did the No 
Feedback group. This is the first time that we have seen an effect emerge on the rule 
resurgence measure in the absence of a significant effect on either rule compliance or 
contingency sensitivity. Critically, the resurgence effect indicates that participants have 
successfully identified a change in task contingencies, but then return to and persist with a 
rule that ‘no longer works’ (i.e., to earn points). More informally, participants clearly know 
that continuing to follow the rule is costing them points, but they persist with ‘dysfunctional’ 
rule-following. In this sense, this effect for coherence on rule resurgence may have important 
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implications for the often-cited role of excessive rule-following in process-based accounts of 
psychological distress (e.g., Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; Zettle & Hayes, 1982). 
As noted above, the resurgence effect was observed in Experiment 2, but not in 
Experiment 1. Whilst an explanation for this disparity must remain speculative, it seems 
valuable to reflect upon the possible variables involved. Specifically, it appears that coherence 
in terms of the presence versus absence of feedback in the context of the derived A-C 
relations (Experiment 2) has an impact (on resurgence) that it does not have in the context of 
the trained A-B and B-C relations (Experiment 1). If we view this result through the lens of 
the MDML framework, the coherence of the target A-C relation in Experiment 1 (required for 
accurate responding on the MTS task), could be considered quite low, even in the Feedback 
condition, because this relation was not presented during the Training IRAP. In addition, level 
of derivation for the A-C relation could be considered quite high (i.e., novel and emergent), 
again because it was not presented during the Training IRAP. 
In Experiment 2, however, the coherence for the A-C relation was higher relative to 
Experiment 1, particularly for the Feedback group (assuming that feedback increases 
coherence). The level of derivation for the A-C relation could also be considered relatively 
low, given that participants had many opportunities (unlike Experiment 1) to derive it within 
the Training IRAP. The critical point here is that the dynamic interaction between coherence 
and derivation may influence rule persistence in the face of reversed reinforcement 
contingencies (see Harte et al. 2017, 2018 for similar arguments). However, the nature of this 
dynamic relationship appears to be complex, in that coherence, as manipulated by the 
presence versus absence of feedback, only has an impact when it applies to the derived A-C 
relation (Experiment 2), rather than to the trained A-B and B-C relations (Experiment 1). 
Indeed, the complexity is compounded by the fact that differential persistent rule-following 
was observed only for the resurgence measure in the current study (in Harte et al., 2018, 
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effects were observed for both rule compliance and contingency sensitivity, but not for rule 
resurgence). If nothing else, this highlights that the functional definition of persistent rule-
following is not a trivial matter, and a more complete understanding of this phenomenon will 
involve explaining why it is observed on one measure in one context but not on another 
measure in a different context. Once again, the MDML framework may be useful here. 
Specifically, in Harte et al. (2017, 2018) derivation was argued to be the variable that was 
manipulated directly, whereas in the current study coherence was manipulated directly (i.e., 
within experiments). Perhaps therefore, resurgence, at least in some contexts, is particularly 
sensitive to shifts in the dimension of coherence. Intuitively this makes sense, if the technical 
concept of coherence is interpreted as functionally similar to ‘truth’, ‘correctness’, ‘veracity’, 
or ‘doing what is right.’ That is, resurgence as a measure involved participants clearly 
contacting the reversed reinforcement contingencies and then returning to a pattern of 
responding that was repeatedly punished by loss of points. Doing so makes sense if the rule 
controlling that resurgence was deemed to be high in ‘truth value’, ‘correctness’, ‘veracity’, 
and imbued with a sense of ‘being the right thing to do’ even if the current contingencies are 
telling you the opposite. 2 
                                                          
2 It is important to emphasize that the dimensions of coherence and derivation as conceptualized 
within the MDML are not defined as entirely separable. Indeed, Barnes-Holmes et al. (2017) 
highlighted that the boundaries among the dimensions and levels within the MDML were “fuzzy” 
(p.14). Furthermore, the primary focus of the framework was to emphasize the dynamics involved in 
the various properties of arbitrarily applicable relational responding. The critical point, therefore, is 
that increases in one dimension may be seen as involving decreases in a second dimension. For 
example, attempting to increase coherence by providing performance feedback on a block of A-C 
trials would likely reduce level of derivation simply because responding on those trials itself involves 
deriving. Nonetheless, providing feedback versus no feedback may be one way in which it is possible 
to manipulate coherence directly while recognizing that derivation may also be impacted. Although 
the inherently dynamic and inseparable nature of the units specified within the MDML might be seen 
as a weakness, it is one shared with many concepts in behavior analysis (e.g., the relationship between 
the eliciting and reinforcing functions of a stimulus). Ultimately, of course, such distinctions either 
stand or fall based on their utility within the basic science and its application. And in the context of the 
current study we have indeed found the distinction between coherence and derivation to be useful. 
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At this point it is worth acknowledging that a possible criticism of the current study is 
that the resurgence effect could be seen as not particularly strong. On balance, the difference 
in effect sizes for resurgence between Experiments 1 and 2 seems far from trivial (i.e., .002-
.08 versus .24-.25). That is, the latter effect size was over three times the size of the former. 
When examining Figure 9 versus 6, the difference in effect sizes appears to be driven by the 
fact that a small sub-group of Feedback participants in Experiment 2 approached 100% 
resurgence responses versus none in the No Feedback group. In contrast in Experiment 1, 
both conditions produced only one participant that approached 100% (with two others in each 
condition above 80%). It appears then that the Feedback in Experiment 2 impacted 
dramatically on a number of participants by leading them to persist with rule-following for 
almost the entire session despite having clearly contacted a reinforcement contingency for not 
doing so. At the current time it remains unclear why only some participants produced this 
highly persistent pattern. One possible reason is that these participants were particularly 
sensitive to the increased level of coherence generated by the performance feedback during 
the A-C test trials. More informally, when presented with a choice to respond in accordance 
with the feedback presented during the A-C test or the feedback presented during the 
schedule, these participants simply opted for the former. If relative differences in coherence 
produced by the feedback during the A-C test versus the schedule is important, then perhaps a 
future study could test this by attempting to manipulate coherence in some other way. For 
example, additional verbal feedback could be used to ‘supercharge’ the coherence functions 
of the A-C feedback. One way to do this might be to use experimenters with potentially high 
versus low levels of social credibility – such as wearing a white lab-coat and using a clipboard 
in contrast to a ‘scruffy’ student in jeans and t-shirt – to deliver informal feedback after A-C 
testing. Would we observe even greater evidence of persistent rule-following in the 
supercharged coherence condition? 
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In grappling with the complexities involved in understanding persistent rule-
following, it is also worth noting that the number of significant correlations was extremely 
limited; between the PRFS and contingency sensitivity in Experiments 1 and 2, and between 
the GPQ and rule-resurgence in Experiment 2 (the latter was restricted to the No Feedback 
condition). Given the large number of correlations that were calculated across the two 
experiments (a total of 64), interpreting these three significant effects should be done with 
extreme caution, particularly for the PRFS because it is not a standardized measure. On 
balance, the GPQ is a standardized measure and the observed correlation makes sense 
intuitively in that higher levels of self-reported pliance predicted increased rule resurgence. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting that the GPQ correlation was only observed for the No Feedback 
condition. Insofar as this correlation is robust, it appears that the relationship between a self-
reported tendency to engage in high levels of rule-following and actual rule-following in an 
experimental task may be moderated by the level of coherence involved in that task. More 
specifically, when coherence is relatively low for a derived rule (because it has not been 
reinforced with feedback) self-reported pliance is more likely to predict performance because 
participants are less certain about the truth or veracity of the rule. Future research will be 
needed to test this conclusion. 
A potential issue worth noting in the current study is the relatively high level of 
attrition observed in Experiment 1 (38/98 participants), although this was much reduced in 
Experiment 2. The exact reason behind the high attrition rate in Experiment 1 remains unclear 
at the current time, but it may have been due to increased ambiguity with regard to the 
meaning of Beda relative to Experiment 2 (i.e., in Experiment 1, up until the MTS task, 
participants had only paired A-B and B-C, but never A-C directly). In any case, levels of 
attrition in both experiments were more or less equal across groups, and thus the within-
experiment difference in rule resurgence observed in Experiment 2 was unlikely due to a 
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difference in attrition. Nonetheless, future research could consider implementing, for 
example, performance-dependent payment, more trials, or longer inter-trial intervals in an 
attempt to reduce or circumvent similar levels of attrition. 
A related issue that is highlighted by the attrition observed in the current study is the 
importance of employing such strict accuracy criteria. In the current context, there was a clear 
need to ensure that all participants entering the MTS task did not learn to perform through 
trial and error. The primary purpose of these criteria, therefore, was to ensure that participants 
were instead responding in accordance with the necessary derivations (e.g. Beda means Least 
Similar) when completing the task. Interestingly, a recent study by Kissi et al. (2019) 
presented results that highlighted how unlikely trial and error learning on the MTS task was in 
the current study. Employing a similar paradigm, Kissi et al. found that, when no instructions 
for responding were provided, all but one participant spontaneously chose the “Most Similar” 
comparison stimulus on the first trial on the MTS task. In contrast, in the current study out of 
a total of 120 participants, 82% chose the correct “Least Similar” comparison on the first trial 
and 89.33% within the first two trials. Clearly, therefore, the seemingly default “Most 
Similar” response that participants tended towards in the Kissi et al. study was far less evident 
in the context of a derived rule that specified the “Least Similar” comparison as the correct 
stimulus.   
The current research appears to constitute the first attempt to examine the impact of 
coherence in the derived relations contained within a rule on persistent rule-following in the 
face of reversed reinforcement contingencies. The results highlight what appear to be 
relatively subtle and complex effects. For example, no significant differences between high 
and low coherence were obtained in Experiment 1, when the trained baseline relations were 
targeted, but an interesting difference did emerge in Experiment 2 (for the resurgence 
measure) when the derived relations were targeted. Adopting the current research strategy 
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thus extends beyond simply demonstrating persistent rule following per se, or searching for 
evidence that it is more or less likely in specific populations. Rather, the type of research 
reported here involved attempting to identify variables that increase or decrease persistent 
rule-following in the face of reversed reinforcement contingencies. Naturally, many questions 
remain to be answered in light of the findings reported here, and of course the terms and 
concepts we have employed in presenting the current work, such as levels of coherence and 
derivation, could always be questioned. Nevertheless, the effects we found, and failed to find, 
will need be to be explained if we are to develop a more complete understanding of persistent 
rule-following. 
In closing, we do recognise that some of the findings and conclusions reported in the 
current research are relatively tentative. Nevertheless, there is much that is novel in the 
current work, particularly the attempt to explore the dimension of coherence as a property of 
arbitrarily applicable relational responding in the context of persistent rule-following. 
Although preliminary, it seems important to share the method and findings reported here with 
the wider scientific community in the hope that other research groups will be encouraged to 
pursue similar lines of enquiry so that we may better understand what appears to be an 
important feature of human behaviour.  
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Table 1 
Stimulus sets employed within each cycle of the Derivation Pre-training Task. 
Derivation Pre-training Task Stimuli 
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set 5 Set 6 
Hond Zwart Hemd Fles Boek Jas 
Dog Black Shirt Bottle XXX //// 
Madra Dubh Leine Buideal Leabhar Cota 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Stimulus sets employed within each of the Training IRAPs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Training IRAPs Stimuli 
Set 7 Set 8 
Least Similar Most Similar 
TTT ]][[ 
Beda Sarua 
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Table 3 
Stimulus combinations employed within each block of trials in each cycle of the Derivation 
Pre-training task. Each cell represents an individual trial. 
 
 Cycle 1 
Relation Type Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
 Set 1 Set 2 Sets 1 + 2 
Known Relations Hond = Dog Zwart = Black Hond ≠ Black 
   Zwart ≠ Dog 
Trained Relations  Dog = Madra Black = Dubh Dog ≠ Dubh 
   Black ≠ Madra 
Derived Relations  Hond = Madra Zwart = Dubh Hond ≠ Dubh 
 Madra = Hond  Dubh = Zwart Zwart ≠ Madra 
 Cycle 2 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
 Set 3 Set 4 Sets 3 + 4 
Known Relations Hemd = Shirt Fles = Bottle Hemd ≠ Bottle 
   Fles ≠ Shirt  
Trained Relations  Shirt = Leine Bottle = Buideal Shirt ≠ Buideal 
   Bottle ≠ Leine 
Derived Relations  Hemd = Leine Fles = Buideal Hemd ≠ Buideal 
 Leine = Hemd Buideal = Fles Fles ≠ Leine 
 Cycle 3 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
 Set 5 Set 6 Set  5  
Trained Relations Boek = XXX Jas = //// Boek ≠ //// 
   Jas ≠ XXX 
Trained Relations  XXX = Leabhar //// = Cota XXX ≠ Cota 
   //// ≠ Leabhar 
Derived Relations  Boek = Leabhar Jas = Cota Boek ≠ Cota 
 Leabhar = Boek  Cota = Jas Jas ≠ Leabhar 
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Figure 1. Diagrammatic representation of the IRAP trial-types that appear in A-B baseline 
relation familiarization block. Arrows did not appear on-screen. The four IRAP trial-
types were denoted as: Least Similar-TTT, Most Similar-TTT, Least Similar-]][[, and 
Most Similar-]][[. 
 
 
Figure 2. Diagrammatic representation of the IRAP trial-types that appear in B-C baseline 
relation familiarization block. Arrows did not appear on-screen. The four IRAP 
trial-types were denoted as: TTT-Beda, ]][[-Beda, TTT-Sarua, and ]][[-Sarua. 
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Figure 3. An example of a single trial and single stimulus set presented in the MTS task. 
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Stage 1 
Questionnaires 
Stage 2 
Derivation Pre-
Training 
Stage 3 
Training IRAP 
Stage 4  
MTS Task 
Stage 5 
Questionnaires 
Phase 1 
Rule-consistent 
(100 Trials) 
 
Phase 2 
Rule-inconsistent 
(50 Trials) 
 
Mixed A-B/B-C relations 
with Feedback                
(2 blocks) 
Mixed A-B/B-C relations 
with No Feedback            
(2 blocks) 
Phase 1              
A-B relations 
Phase 2              
B-C relations 
Phase 3       
Mixed A-B/B-C 
relations 
Cycle 
1 
Cycle 
3 
Cycle 
2 
Phase 3 
Phase 2 
Phase 1 
Phase 3 
Phase 2 
Phase 1 
Phase 3 
Phase 2 
Phase 1 
* 
Phase 4       
Mixed A-B/B-C 
relations 
Figure 4. A flow chart of the experimental sequence of Experiment 1. * See Table 2 for the specific stimulus set sequencing presented within 
each phase of each cycle involved in Stage 2. 
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Figure 5. Experiment 1: Mean rule compliance scores (left panel) and contingency sensitivity 
scores (right panel), with standard error bars for the Feedback and No Feedback 
conditions. 
 
 
Figure 6. Experiment 1: Box plots with a violin element illustrating the distribution and 
density of participant rule resurgence scores with all participants included (left 
panel) and excluding participants who did not demonstrate contingency sensitive 
responding (right panel) for the Feedback and No Feedback conditions.  
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Figure 7. Diagrammatic representation of the four IRAP trial-types that appear in the A-C 
relation test blocks. Arrows did not appear on-screen. The four IRAP trial-types were 
denoted as: Least Similar-Beda, Most Similar-Beda, Least Similar-Sarua, and Most 
Similar-Sarua.  
 
 
Figure 8. Experiment 2: Mean rule compliance scores (left panel) and contingency sensitivity 
scores (right panel), with standard error bars for the Feedback and No Feedback 
conditions. 
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Figure 9. Experiment 2: Box plots with a violin element illustrating the distribution and 
density of participant rule resurgence scores with all participants included (left 
panel) and excluding participants who did not demonstrate contingency sensitive 
responding (right panel) for the Feedback and No Feedback conditions.  
 
 
